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justification to “[…] be appropriate to the nature of the situations in which the idea of 
justice is mobilized” (165). Such a theory does not start from ideal or idealized premises, 
but from our present situation. And it does not necessarily ask for the solution to the 
problem, but for possible steps towards a better situation.
Chapter 9 takes us “Beyond justice” – thus its title – to a world in which states 
“[…] substitute acceptability of common rules for controversial claims of justice” (191), 
i.e. to the world we actually live in. The fundamental problem to resolve is not theo-
retical – finding an adequate abstract justification for equally abstract norms of justice 
applicable to our present situation –, but practical: “[…] finding a system of rules and 
burden-sharing that major states capable of acting on the problem [...] may wish to join 
voluntarily in order to cooperate” (198). Neither the United States, nor China, nor India 
will be motivated to change their climate politics by sophisticated theories of climate 
justice. So rather than develop a new abstract conception of climate justice, one should 
see what can be done given the motivational structure of these and other main actors.
What all this finally amounts to is that the more we concentrate on the search for 
contextually acceptable rules, “[…] the more implausible it becomes for considerations 
of international justice to play a significant part” (199). And this means that abstract 
philosophy, however sophisticated its theories of justice may be or are yet to become 
in the future, are of no great use for solving our contemporary climate problems.
Godard’s book does not attempt to give us concrete solutions – the actors involved 
must find them on the basis of what they can accept –, and the author’s major aim is 
to draw our attention to the fact that solutions are always tributary to what might be 
called a solution-framework, and hence he addresses the question of what a useful 
solution-framework would look like in the world we actually live in. Such a solution-
framework should not be founded on an abstract concept of justice, but should start 
rather from the fact that what matters is to motivate states. The best concept of justice 
is of no value if states do not comply with the norms derived from it. Hence Godard’s 
book could also have as a subtitle: climate change and the limits of applied ethics.
Yet giving it such a subtitle would be ignoring the fact that applied ethics cannot 
be reduced to Rawlsian or utilitarian theories of justice. Calling our problem with the 
resolution of the climate problem a ‘motivational’ problem opens the door to an analy-
sis of the relevance of a Humean or Schopenhauerian approach to the question. It is 
not applied ethics as such that is disqualified or promised an insignificant role in the 
future, but only a certain type of normative applied ethics.
Norbert Campagna
Université du Luxembourg
Daniel HalliDay. The Inheritance of Wealth. Justice, Equality, and the Right to Bequeath. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. 256 pp.
In The Inheritance of Wealth, Daniel Halliday sets out to examine the moral grounds 
of the right to bequeath or transfer wealth. The explicit aims of the book are to identify 
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the conditions under which inherited wealth undermines social justice, and to shed light 
on some long-standing theoretical disagreements between competing theories of social 
justice, especially egalitarianism, utilitarianism, and libertarianism. The main argument is 
that inherited wealth causes and maintains economic segregation, which leads to an unjust 
society in which certain groups possess arbitrary enjoyment of privilege and status com-
pared to other groups. Halliday argues that the accumulation of wealth over time is one 
among many mechanisms that cause and maintain these group differences. The proposed 
way forward is to revive an old but underappreciated tax policy, namely the Rignano 
scheme. This scheme makes inheritance taxation progressive over time, meaning that ‘old’ 
wealth is taxed at a higher rate than ‘young’ wealth. Halliday argues that the Rignano 
scheme is a more effective and just institution for limiting the accumulation of wealth 
over time and fighting economic segregation than other more common tax policies.
This eight-chapter book can be divided into three parts. The first part reconstructs 
various arguments on inheritance and bequest in the early liberal and utilitarian tradi-
tions. This topic, however, has been covered extensively, and indeed more thoroughly, 
in the philosophical literature so a specialist reader will not find much new here. This 
analysis is followed by an illuminating reconstruction of Rignano’s views on taxation 
and a discussion of some of his early critics, which has attracted much less attention in 
contemporary political philosophy.
The second part, which consists of Chapters 4-6, forms the book’s argumentative 
core. Chapters 4 and 5 spell out the egalitarian commitments underlying Halliday’s claim 
that economic segregation violates egalitarian values. In Chapter 4, Halliday offers a range 
of arguments to show that some influential luck egalitarian positions cannot give a satis-
factory account of how to regulate inheritance and the right to bequeath. In Chapter 5, 
Halliday turns to relational egalitarianism and argues for an egalitarian account that com-
bines relational egalitarian and luck egalitarian elements. He argues that the concern for 
brute luck which luck egalitarians put at centre stage in thinking about justice is wrong 
to target the mere fact of receiving an inheritance. There is, Halliday argues, nothing 
morally objectionable about receiving a small inheritance even though this is a matter of 
brute luck (77-78). Rather, Halliday forcefully argues that egalitarians must point out the 
effects of being born into an economic group whose privileges are maintained in part by 
large flows of inherited wealth, which is the relevant kind of ‘brute luck’ egalitarians 
should focus on in the context of inheritance and the right to bequeath (110-112). Hal-
liday rightly stresses that understanding brute luck in terms of being born as a member 
of a certain social group can help us interpret some crucial claims in luck egalitarianism. 
However, while he claims that this argument combines luck egalitarian and relational egal-
itarian concerns, what he actually shows is that luck egalitarians and relational egalitarians 
can both agree on this claim. Halliday explicitly employs the latter strategy in a later argu-
ment in the book where he argues that at least some libertarians have good reasons to 
defend the Rignano scheme even though they do not share Halliday’s egalitarian com-
mitments (171-176). In general, it is not always clear whether Halliday wants to argue that 
certain positions are forced to accept certain conclusions about inheritance, or that they 
are forced to change their underlying normative assumptions.
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The rest of Chapter 5 is devoted to one of the core concepts of the book: eco-
nomic segregation. Economic segregation occurs when an individual’s life prospects and 
social status depend on her membership of a group that possesses greater wealth than 
other groups. The crucial point of the argument is that wealth attracts nonfinancial 
capital, including social capital (i.e. “valuable knowledge and opportunities” [107]) and 
cultural capital (i.e. “behavioural norms or dispositions” [107]). The differences in access 
to nonfinancial capital that comes with being a member of specific social groups causes 
and maintains economic segregation.
Halliday’s discussion in Chapter 6 of the philosophical and sociological literature 
on how the family plays a pivotal role in maintaining economic segregation are among 
the best parts of the book. The crux of his analysis is that it is the accumulation of 
wealth over time that leads to an unfair distribution of access to nonfinancial capital, 
and that the family plays a pivotal role in transferring these privileges from one genera-
tion to the next. Crucial here is his claim that someone’s accumulation of nonfinancial 
capital is not the result of one transaction from parent to child but can be the result of 
the history of inheritance flows higher up in the family tree (140). This latter claim is 
developed in the rest of Chapter 6, which aims to show that inequalities in wealth rep-
licate and may even increase over time. Combined with some arguments of how wealth 
attracts nonfinancial capital, this sets the stage for the Rignano scheme as morally supe-
rior to other taxation policies.
The third and final part of the book starts with a discussion of some possible 
libertarian lines of argument for and against inheritance tax. This discussion, though 
interesting, is not very in-depth, and comes across as a bit too late given that the book’s 
core arguments have already been defended. What it does show is that even without 
egalitarian foundations the Rignano scheme may have merit over more common tax 
policies. The eighth and final chapter focusses on institutional design in relation to the 
Rignano scheme as well as how tax policies could be designed to counter issues such as 
non-compliance. However, it is precisely in giving a more specified account of the 
Rignano scheme that the book does not really deliver. Halliday himself notes that the 
“[…] question of age sensitivity as a feature of wealth transfer taxation […] deserves 
more of an extended philosophical examination than it has so far had in the literature” 
(194). I fully grant that this is true, and Halliday does much to show why such an 
examination may be fruitful, but it is precisely this examination that I had hoped Hal-
liday would have done more thoroughly. Especially in his discussion about actual insti-
tutions, Halliday seems hesitant to propose concrete institutional changes. A discussion 
of, for example, one or two case studies would have been valuable in Halliday’s defence 
of the Rignano scheme.
This book length discussion of inheritance tax is a welcome and necessary step in 
moving the underdeveloped academic debate about taxation and inheritance forward. 
While the book is clearly written and develops interesting arguments and proposals in 
a structured and mostly convincing way, its main strength lies in showing where the 
conflict and normative issues lie rather than in developing a mature theory of just taxa-
tion or proposing concrete measures at the level of institutional design. In proposing 
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the Rignano scheme, however, the book opens up the possibility for a very interesting 
way of thinking about justice and inheritance in the future.
Dick Timmer
Utrecht University
Shannon Vallor. Technology and the Virtues: A Philosophical Guide to a Future Worth 
Wanting. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. 309 pp.
In the wake of the Cambridge Analytica and Facebook scandal, few people would 
probably deny how deeply technology is embedded in all aspects of our daily life. Any 
ethical reflection on what we consider a valuable life to pursue is therefore unavoidably 
linked to the question how we live with technology. The recent book by Shannon Val-
lor provides an excellent reflection on this question.
The book is divided into three parts. The first lays the philosophical foundations 
for a technomoral virtue ethic. Already in the first chapter, Vallor takes an explicitly 
inclusive approach to virtues by not only introducing the classical Greek notion of vir-
tue but also the Confucian equivalent notion of de (德), which is usually translated as 
virtue or ethical power. In this part of the book, Vallor makes a case for a virtue-based 
framework for thinking about the good life in a technological age.
The second part is devoted to cultivating technomoral virtues. Starting from the 
virtues discussed in the traditional literature, Vallor argues for new virtues for the 21st 
century, which she aptly calls ‘techno-moral virtues’. These techno-moral values include, 
in addition to more traditional virtues such as honesty, justice and empathy, also tech-
nomoral wisdom. Technomoral wisdom enables a person to “[…] extend […] natural 
moral attitudes of caring concern (such as love, fairness, benevolence, respect, or com-
passion) beyond their initial scope, as called for by the general and situational demands 
of morality” (116). This notion of extension is especially relevant in light of emerging 
technosocial developments. Certain kinds of technologies may expand or narrow the 
scope of our moral concern. For that reason, living well with technologies ultimately 
boils down to the question whether “[…] the human family [is] able to live well with 
emerging technologies such as social media, artificial intelligence, social robots, bio-
medical enhancement, and ubiquitous surveillance – as well as any number of disruptive 
technologies whose emergence we cannot possibly hope to anticipate – seem to depend 
upon our ability to encourage the wider, even global, cultivation of the technomoral vir-
tues” (117; italics original).
The third part is devoted to an in-depth discussion of some sample emerging 
technologies: new social media, digital surveillance and self-tracking, military and social 
robotics, and biomedical enhancement. If there is one point of criticism to be men-
tioned, it is the lack of examples related to energy and climate change in this third part. 
An exploration of food technologies that are based on synthetic biology that would 
reduce the impact of our consumption patterns, for example, would have been interest-
ing. But the attentive reader could also implicitly derive these examples for him or 
